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Abstract
This note offers reflections on qualified market access (QMA)*the practice of linking trade
agreements to values such as human rights, labour standards, or environmental protection. This
idea has been suggested by political theorists as a way of fulfilling our duties to the global poor and
of making the global economic system more just, and it has influenced a number of concrete
policies, such as European Union (EU) trade policies. Yet, in order to assess its merits tout court,
different perspectives and disciplines need to be brought together, such as international law,
economics, political science, and philosophy. It is also worth reflecting on existing practices, such
as those of the EU. This note summarises some insights about QMA by drawing such research
together and considers the areas in which further research is needed, whilst reflecting also on the
merits of interdisciplinary exchanges on such topics.
Keywords: trade justice; qualified market access; generalised system of preferences; human
rights; labour standards; World Trade Organization; inter-disciplinarity
It is widely known that individuals in many places worldwide could have better living
and working conditions. Many live in poverty, many are inhumanely treated, and
many work in conditions that are barely, if at all, tolerable, for long hours, with low
pay, and under limited health and safety provisions. Such concerns are often linked
with the workings of the global economy. One of the basic theoretical justifications
for trade and the spread of markets is that they allow for bargains that are profitable
for all sides. But the conditions noted above have led some to wonder whether the
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particular structures of the global economy realise this ideal. Questions have been
raised as to whether and how the trade system could be designed to improve the
living and working conditions of, at least, badly off individuals to a greater extent.
One suggestion in this context is the idea of qualified market access (QMA): the
idea that trade relationships should be made conditional upon their meeting various
requirements, such as human rights, labour standards, or environmental regulations.
Depending on whether or not these conditions are met, countries should be given
incentives or sanctions, in the form of preferential or disadvantageous market access.
In recent academic literature, Barry and Reddy have pursued the idea of QMA in
their development of an account of a coordinated system of ‘linkage’, designed to
promote respect for labour standards in developing countries by offering improved
access to the markets of wealthier states. This system, coordinated by the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and International Labour Organization (ILO), would
provide the means of enhancing labour rights protection within a system designed to
ensure it is not co-opted by protectionist interests.1 But QMA is more than a
theoretical idea. It figures in areas of global trade governance, for example, in the
EU’s so-called GSP, which is a sub-scheme of its generalised system of preferences
(GSP), a tariff preference system that can be granted to developing countries under
the rules of the WTO.2 In 2008, the European Commission commissioned an
extensive report on QMA,3 and the EU has recently finalised a substantial reform of
its GSP, including its GSP regime (see Regulation No. 978/2012 of 31 October
2012), with the new rules applying from January 2014. Similar objectives can also be
found in the Fair Trade initiative.4
Yet, in this note, we hope to highlight important ways in which analysis of QMA
could be usefully developed. Our most central argument is that to undertake a
comprehensive assessment of QMA (and other similar policy proposals), it is
distinctly important that the perspectives of different disciplines are brought together
to a greater extent.5 It is a subject on which contributions can be made by, inter alia,
philosophers, economists, political scientists, legal scholars, and practitioners. But it
is by drawing this range of experience and knowledge together that we can form a
complete picture of QMA and determine how, if at all, QMA can best be defended
and which questions remain in need of answers.
The note demonstrates this point by making an attempt to bring together various
strands of QMA analysis from different disciplines (although without a claim to
completeness).6 The paper proceeds in a deductive fashion. In the next section, we
highlight important themes that different disciplines can contribute to the debate
about QMA. We begin by discussing the foundational moral concerns that motivate
QMA and the rationale for focusing these concerns through QMA. We, then, move
to discussing its practical viability and likely impact. In the last of these subsections,
we draw the analysis together by summarising the key challenges that face defenders
of QMA and use this analysis to identify the areas in which further research is
needed. To aid the flow of this text, the discussion is written from an ‘internal’
perspective, focused primarily on exploring the dimensions of QMA, the ways in
which advocates of the idea will encounter challenges, and how responses can be
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shaped along certain lines. However, we use the final section to offer a more explicit
reflective commentary, in which we outline more directly what we think the
discussion demonstrates both in terms of how to proceed with analysis of QMA
and in terms of the importance of interdisciplinary exchanges on subjects of its kind.
QMA: THE CENTRAL THEMES
Normative grounding
At the root of any social, economic, or political policy, one would hope to find a
convincing normative rationale. Without such a rationale, those who argue in favour
of a policy cannot reject the claim that they are illegitimately imposing their
preferences on others. In the context of QMA this topic deserves special attention,
because policies implemented by Western countries vis-a`-vis developing countries
might have a chime of imperialism.7 In addition, there is the possibility that a
minority within Western countries might impose their preferences on a silent
majority.
Providing such normative rationales is the task of philosophy and political theory,
usually by drawing on principles of justice. In the case of QMA, Mathias Risse and
Aaron James argue that the promotion of justice is sufficiently important to justify
imposing norms on others. Risse’s main emphasis is on human rights, but he also
brings forward the shared membership in a trading system and in the global order as
‘grounds of justice’.8 James argues for the legitimacy of regulation by highlighting the
analogy to extreme cases such as sexual servitude and slavery, in which we do seem to
think leaving the behaviour unchallenged is problematic, because they constitute
impermissible forms of treatment that cannot be justified in the name of larger
societal benefits.9
A more contentious topic is labour rights. For example, large companies might be
able to hire desperate workers at low wages and with high-risk working conditions,
without these conditions being compensated by the benefits received. It might be
argued that policies aimed at improving such working conditions could also be
justified.10 Nonetheless, it is not so clear whether Western countries*which might
have similar problems internally*are justified in imposing these values on other
countries, which might have more urgent priorities. Barry & Reddy operate by
‘presuming that . . . advantage is generally enhanced by higher employment, higher
real wages and improved working conditions’.11 Insofar as this claim merely regards
what constitutes ‘advantage’, it is probably valid. However, it bears mentioning that
it is a jump from this claim to the claim that such goals justify policies designed to
alter the internal regulation of other states. There may be space for reasonable
disagreement on what constitutes good working conditions, or, at least, the extent to
which they should be treated as a priority.12 For that matter, it is possible to agree
that working conditions should be improved, but simply have an alternative strategy
for aiding their development: many have argued, for example, that freer markets can
act as a stimulus to growth and, thereby, enhance the capacity to realise more just
Qualified market access
85
conditions.13 If there is space for disagreement on any of these issues, more argument
is needed in order to move from a claim about the role of working conditions in a
conception of advantage to the claim that such ideas can justify policies designed to
modify regulation in other states.
Thus, there are a number of options for how to provide a normative rationale for
QMA, but one must be careful not to jump to conclusions too quickly. Without
meaning to suggest that the labour rights argument cannot provide a justification, it
seems important to avoid being overly concerned with ‘keeping our hands’ clean
without taking seriously how we impose on others, and that we construct appropriate
argument if we wish to use such bases for justification. In this regard, it may be a
safer option to argue from the less controversial bases of human rights and the other
fundamental moral concerns mentioned above. In these areas, at least, there
does seem to be a firm justification for policies designed to promote more just
behaviour.
Focusing on trade
These reflections lead to a second question: why should justice be promoted through
trade? This question has both a philosophical and a practical dimension. On a
philosophical level, there is the question of whether there is something specific about
the trade relations in which we stand with other individuals, mandating that we pay
attention to the normative qualities of these relations, rather than, say, helping those
who can be reached most easily. James, for example, holds that trade relations that
violate certain basic standards might not be morally permissible at all.14 Other
commentators might be more inclined to see the focus on trade as a merely practical
issue*one means through which we could promote general concerns of justice.15 In
short, QMA seems to raise an important question in terms of whether we should
consider our duties to ‘trade justly’ as special or general duties.
Especially if one adopts the latter approach, it is important to remember the range
of ways through which we could promote or protect demands of justice, even if we
remain close to the sphere of trade. If one takes a look at existing practices, such as
the EC’s policies, it turns out that there are a number of QMA-type policies.16 The
range includes:
1. QMA, which prevents or restricts the access of particular goods produced under
certain conditions to a market, such as product standards like sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.
2. A GSP sub-scheme, which grants additional market access to a country
depending on whether it meets a range of criteria and fulfils certain country
characteristics.
Beyond QMA-type measures, there are a host of other options, including:
1. Voluntary individual action, which has the advantages of flexibility and of not
imposing values on others.
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2. Nudging measures, such as mandatory labels, which are less intrusive, and
might address problems of imperfect rationality or information asymmetries, by,
for example, allowing Western consumers to choose between certified and non-
certified products.
3. Policies in the context of government procurement, which are not subject to the
legal issues discussed below, and might be of symbolic value, but raise concerns
about the functions and tasks of government agencies.
4. Direct policies, such as aid, government loans, or technical support.
It might seem less pressing to consider some of these policy alternatives if there are
rather strict specific duties of justice owed to trading partners. But in order to pursue
this line, it is important to note that careful argument is needed to tie the issues
together in this fashion. It perhaps seems most plausible to connect issues such as
labour standards to market regulation. As James writes: ‘the trading system is the
natural place to address the labor exploitation issue, since concerns of labor
exploitation are at least partly internal to the socioeconomic relationship’.17 But
such an argument leads us back to the question of whether labour standards can
serve as the appropriate normative framework. If, as the previous section suggested,
operating from a human rights basis seems the most straightforward normative
grounding for a policy like QMA, it seems to require quite intricate argumentation to
explain why this clearly general concern should take the form of a special duty of trade
justice.
Moreover, even if an argument for special duties can be made, it would remain the
case that we need to consider both the viability and consequences, both direct and
indirect, of any approach, since sound policy requires not only that the policy work,
but that, taking all things together, it is the best way of achieving the relevant
objectives.18 To determine any case in favour of QMA, these issues must be
considered.
Viability: legal challenges and existing institutions
Perhaps the most pressing question in terms of viability concerns international trade
law.19 It is worth going into some detail here, in order to illustrate the intricacies that
one encounters if one wants to put an abstract idea into practice, at least within the
existing legal framework.
Amongst the more direct ways in which we can pursue ‘QMA’ (in the sense
described in the list above) are the actions of forbidding or restricting the quantity of
imports of a certain commodity, the impositions of punitive tariffs, and the
imposition of a punitive internal tariff. Whilst theoretically feasible, all of these
actions are problematic under WTO law. The first is accepted in certain ‘exemption’
cases, such as for goods produced under prison labour, but largely rejected
otherwise. The second violates GATT’s Article II, which requires that tariffs must
not exceed agreed levels. Meanwhile, the third violates the national treatment
provision of the WTO system, which requires that, once they have paid any import
duties, imported goods are treated the same as nationally produced goods. In all of
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these cases, much depends on whether it can be shown that the good in question is
not ‘like’ other goods to which it is being compared. There are four cumulative
criteria employed to determine this issue:
1. Properties, nature, and quality.
2. End use of the product.
3. Consumer perception and behaviour.
4. Tariff classification.
This legal avenue has been used in WTO law in attempts to qualify the market access
of certain goods, but such manoeuvres are not often upheld.
One route around these requirements is to appeal to Article XX of the
GATT, which regards exemptions to standard rules. This article is designed to
enable countries to make product distinctions based on policy objectives that,
inter alia, are:
1. Necessary to protect public morals.
2. Necessary to protect human, animal, and plant life or health.
3. Relating to the conservation of natural resources.
But while apparently allowing for QMA measures, the burden of proof for those who
want to impose sanctions along these lines is high and includes showing that the
preferred policies are no more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the desired
goal. Also, it should be noted that Article XX can be used to protect moral ends
within one’s own country, but it is typically, both in theory and practice, deemed to
have a non-extraterritoriality clause.
The alternative*and seemingly only available*route around standard WTO
conventions appears in Part IV of the GATT. This part involves the Enabling Clause
under which generalised systems of preferences*the second QMA-type measure
mentioned earlier*can be constructed. This avenue enables market actors to
organise a set of market privileges*usually beneficially asymmetric tariff regimes*
for developing countries on the condition that the latter protect or promote certain
standards. The EU, for example, allows developing countries to export goods to their
markets subject to lower tariffs than are applied to other states. It has a system,
adopted unilaterally, applied to 15 developing countries, which are required to meet
27 core human rights and labour standards in return for more preferential access to
the EU market compared to those countries which benefit from the standard GSP.20
This system is not only in existence at present, but has also been used for precisely
the purposes QMA sets. There are three cases in which the EU has withdrawn
preferential market access for the violation of the required standards: Belarus,
Sri Lanka, and Burma/Myanmar.21 However, the extent to which the removal of the
trade preferences has had any real impact on the ground is difficult to judge. As such,
the example does suggest that there is, at least, one viable route for pursuing QMA-
type measures, but it remains crucial to consider the issue of consequences.
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The cynic, the crux, and the consequences
One way to bring together a picture of QMA is to begin from a completely negative
view*a ‘cynic’s view’*that highlights all potential problems and to explore which of
these problems can be answered.22 A cynic might raise the following objections to
linking trade to respect for normative values:
1. All moral values are relative.
2. It is objectionable to push others to uphold even universal values.
3. Attempts to encourage others to adopt certain values through trade restrictions
would be unviable in terms of international economic law.
4. Attempts to encourage others to adopt certain values through trade restrictions
would not achieve the intended aim because:
a. They are ineffective mechanisms.
b. They could have problematic by-products.
In the aforementioned sections, we have identified arguments that advocates of
QMA could use to address issues 13. On 1 and 2, it would seem that certain core
human rights, and maybe also environmental issues, are concerns that are both
universal and permissible to encourage others to respect. Whether these points
extend to certain ‘softer’ standards, such as respect for labour rights, is more
controversial, but at least some case can be made against the cynic. If 3 were
insurmountable, it would present a major difficulty for QMA, at least if we make the
(not unrealistic) assumption that states, in general, need to abide by international
economic law, if only for long-term pragmatic reasons. But as noted above, although
some avenues for pursuing QMA remain difficult in international economic
law, the Enabling Clause allows for a system that can and has been used for
QMA-type policies. If this analysis is correct, it appears that the crux of the argument
that must be made against the cynic concerns 4*the consequences of pursuing
QMA-type policies.
Worry 4 can be broken into two parts. On the one hand, there is (a) the worry that
QMA-type policies simply would not have much positive impact. This worry is
along the lines of ‘missing the nail’. On the other hand, there is (b) the worry
that whether or not the policy has a positive direct impact, it may also produce
negative by-products. This worry is along the lines of hitting the nail, but cracking
the wall.
There are certainly genuine reasons to fear the latter effect. Obviously, such policies
can be used as a smoke screen for protectionist interests*pig farmers can find reasons
to raise tariffs on imported pork by drawing on ‘concerns’ about standards of
production overseas.23 Such action might lead to a spiral of retaliatory protectionist
measures that would, in the end, violate the interests of those who currently profit from
open markets, including many of the globally poor. The consequences of the latter
scenario might do more harm to the basic rights of the globally poor than anything
positive that even an ideal system of QMA might achieve. On the contrary, if the
measure was mobilised through the Enabling Clause avenue suggested above, we
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might have some reason for optimism here. As noted, the GSP structure has been
present for some time within an on-going framework of existing international treaties
and has not brought down the WTO system.
The former worry*the likely direct consequences of QMA-type policies*seems
to present a more pressing problem. In terms of the substantive information we hold
on this point, the outlook is not positive. But, in fact, we know very little about the
impact of QMA-type measures. For example, there is no hard evidence of any
positive impact on the observance of human rights in the countries on which the EU
imposed sanctions within the GSP framework.24 In addition, there are general
questions about the adequacy and coherence of measures and goals. For example, it
is unlikely that the money raised from additional tariffs, wherever it is reaped and
spent, will be of the right order to address the concerns usually linked with QMA.25
On this point, those critical of QMA stress that, very often, we would be more likely
to source the necessary funds and direct them appropriately by using non-market
mechanisms, such as aid.
If one were to attempt a reply to the cynic on these worries, there seem to be two
relevant points to make. On the latter thought that there might be alternative
mechanisms for promoting justice, it might be remembered that we operate within
constrained institutional parameters. Aid budgets are commonly under threat
in most countries, perhaps even more so during recession, and, in general, it is
harder to create new institutions and policies than to use those that already exist.26
Indeed, the QMA debate itself demonstrates the difficulty of attempting to
operationalise various policy options within the current global framework. Against
this background, it would seem sensible not to abandon the idea of QMA prematurely.
There does remain the worry regarding evidence of positive impact, but it is worth
noting here that we also have little evidence to suggest that the GSP programme
did not help, in some way or other, to improve the protection of human rights in
the countries that do participate in the scheme. It is, after all, extremely difficult to
unravel which factors influence improvements in rights protection, and the latter is
hard to measure. Perhaps what should be said here is that more research is needed,
particularly in terms of more precise measurements and more in-depth studies of
the effect of incentives on performance. These would help us determine what we can
realistically expect from QMA and how existing institutions might be improved. Such
investigation would also need to take into account indirect effects, including symbolic
and spiralling effects. For example, it would be useful to know whether one country’s
refusal to continue certain policies might convince other countries to follow suit, thus
creating a critical mass for promoting certain changes in international agreements.
After all, the long-term cumulative value of building human rights concerns into a
number of international agreements has been suggested by a number of recent
studies.27
To be sure, lack of evidence cuts in both directions. It is no more reason
for optimism than pessimism. But the above should, at least, identify where
more research is required in order for the advocate of QMA to respond to the
cynic.
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REFLECTIONS
The previous section sought primarily to clarify central themes in the QMA debate
whilst drawing attention to areas where further research is required. But it also
brings to light, we think, a deeper point about the importance of using an
interdisciplinary approach for evaluating proposals such as QMA. This point can
be demonstrated with reflections on two insights that can be gleaned from what has
been said above.
Questions answered
It is obvious that different disciplines can contribute answers to different questions
with regard to a proposal such as QMA. But it is perhaps underappreciated what can
be gained from hearing this variety of questions and answers. Indeed, it may
sometimes come as a surprise to scholars of other disciplines that what seem some of
the most troubling concerns from one perspective are issues interrogated and
addressed by others whilst, conversely, some assumptions taken for granted in one
place may be significantly problematised. In the context of QMA, the clearest
example of this possibility concerns the question of normative foundations. Here,
empirical social scientists may assume that QMA policies amount to an ‘imper-
ialistic’ imposition of values on other countries, without considering arguments
about justice proposed by philosophers and political theorists which appear to
address such worries. A similar point might be made regarding questions of
institutional structures and implementation. In this case, political philosophers
may sometimes be too prone to assuming that there will be viable and effective ways
to realise desirable normative ends in normatively desirable fashions within existing
institutions. The legal analysis of QMA suggests, however, that matters might be
rather more complicated, and that operationising such a system might warrant
working through quite tightly constrained parameters. Here, again, the inter-
disciplinary exchange seems to help narrow our analysis of QMA and identify how
central questions*such as viability*can be sensibly addressed.
Questions opened
Inter-disciplinary exchanges also help clarify which questions remain unanswered or
not answered satisfactorily. It might be suggested that another assumption
unfortunately common in political philosophy is that we have the knowledge to
predict the consequences of certain policy measures, without asking whether such
studies have ever been undertaken, and what methodological problems they might
encounter.28 But things are often more complicated in empirical research, and often
we may not be able to derive clear ‘ifthen’-statements from the existing scholarship.
In extreme cases, empirical research may show the impossibility of implemen-
ting certain policies. This might lead to ‘ought implies can’ limitations on what
can be normatively demanded. In most cases, however, one does not deal with strict
impossibilities, but with questions about the advantages and disadvantages of
different solutions, all of which need to be carefully considered when evaluating
which one can best be endorsed from a normative perspective. These points
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raise questions for normative theorising such as: How non-ideal does non-ideal
theory need to be in order to address the real world? And: How much knowledge
about the real world does one need in order to be able to theorise at this level? In
relation to this latter question, the dialogue with empirical scientists can help
philosophers identify the practical terrain within which normative policy advocacy
must operate.
In the case of QMA, it transpires that there remains a crucial question about its
consequences that social scientific research has not yet answered. The literature in
economics and political science has emphasised possible instabilities that might arise
from policies like QMA, the potential for abuse by, for example, protectionist forces,
and areas in which there could be negative indirect effects. These research results
point towards possible trade-offs of changes in the institutional structure. But
they fall short of offering robust information about the consequences of QMA-type
policies, which would be sufficient for a final verdict. Thus, it would seem that
one of the most significant insights that can be drawn from considering QMA
through the inter-disciplinary lens is that it can help us focus attention away from
the questions that other disciplines can answer and on to what the different
disciplines all find absent*in this case, more extensive research on the concrete
consequences of QMA-type measures. This last point suggests that scholars in
empirical studies might find it useful to enter discussion with normative theorists
with the goal of identifying the focal moral aims for reforming international
structures, such that empirical research can engage more directly in the task of
exploring which concrete pathways are advisable for realising normatively desirable
states of affairs.
Interdisciplinary research often takes additional efforts, if only for understanding
one another’s jargons and implicit assumptions. But as we hope to have shown, for
evaluating suggestions such as QMA, it is nonetheless crucial to bring together
different perspectives. There are clearly lessons to be learned for the practice of all
disciplinary studies, both about the content and nature of their research. Perhaps
more importantly, insights from different disciplines can lead to conclusions about
where the crux of the issue lies*such as the consensus that more research on the
concrete consequences of QMA-type measures is needed in order to take the
evaluation to the next step. This is a promising result, and suggests that such
evaluations are indispensable for engaging in genuinely tout court analyses of policy
proposals and how plausible such proposals should be deemed as suggestions for
making the global order more just.
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attempts to integrate them, while the philosophical foundations of QMA were not discussed
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University of Michigan Press, 2006), 6992.
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Risse, On Global Justice, 26180.
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Contemporary Politics 20, no. 1 (2014): 6376.
22. This summary is loosely based on L. Herzog and A. Walton, ‘QMA Tout Court?’, (presented
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